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Culture is a meritocracy: Why creative workers’ attitudes may reinforce social inequality 
Mark Taylor (Sheffield)1 and Dave O’Brien (Goldsmiths)2 
Abstract 
This article investigates attitudes towards inequality among creative workers. In the UK, there is 
considerable public interest in access to creative jobs, and a concern that these jobs are limited to 
those from privileged backgrounds. Moreover, both inequalities in cultural work and the attitudes of 
cultural workers have been important areas of study for existing research. Based on a web survey 
(N=2487), this article investigates attitudes among creative workers, and finds that the 
characteristics that are most consistently associated with success by creative workers are hard work 
and ambition, rather than structural factors, such privileged social origins, gender or ethnicity. Using 
principal components analysis and regression, we show that there are three main factors related to 
getting ahead, associated with reproduction, meritocracy, and education, and we show that those in 
the most privileged positions – broadly, the highest-paid white non-disabled men – are those most 
likely to deny an account of success in the creative industries. We conclude that the attitudes held 
by creative workers, and who holds which attitudes, make it unlikely that access to the sector and 
trajectories of individual progression within the sector will change. 
Highlights 
 Analysis of unique web survey of cultural workers and their attitudes to getting ahead 
 The attributes most commonly described as “essential” to getting ahead are hard work and 
ambition 
 Most positive attitudes towards getting ahead in the sector came from those in privileged 
positions 
 Demonstrates the challenges for those seeking to raise awareness of inequality in the 
cultural sector 
Keywords 
cultural workers, principal components analysis, inequality, attitudes, meritocracy  
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Entry and access to cultural and creative jobs is currently a major issue of interest in social and 
traditional media discussions. The shape of the cultural workforce, along with the attendant impact 
on what is produced and who consumes that production, underpins high profile global discussions of 
cultural sectors including film (#oscarssowhite) and video games (#gamergate). The subject has also 
been a core area of concern for academic research, developing from cultural studies (e.g. 
Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010) to include a range of sociological perspectives (Conor et al 2015, 
O’Brien et al 2016). American (e.g. Mayer 2011, Koppman 2015), French (Dubois 2016), and British 
(Friedman et al 2016) case studies have suggested significant barriers to entry and success in cultural 
jobs. These barriers track other forms of social stratification, mapping onto - but not exactly 
mirroring - social divisions of wealth, status, gender and race.  
However, there has been a lower level of research interest in the attitudes held by those working in 
the sector. This is a curious omission given the centrality of attitudinal perspectives accorded to one 
of the foundational theories of the creative economy, Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’ (Florida 2002). 
There is a tradition of qualitative engagement with ethnographic and interview data that has 
revealed a variety of orientations towards ‘getting ahead’ in cultural work (see Oakley and O’Brien 
2015 for a review), including theorising the sense of guilt or failure when confronted with the 
structural inequalities endemic to the creative sector (McRobbie 2016). In this context, the current 
paper focuses on a specific aspect of these structures, the idea of meritocracy within cultural jobs.  
The paper begins by reviewing the literature on cultural work and inequalities in cultural and 
creative jobs, before moving to outline broader research on attitudes to social inequality. The paper 
then demonstrates, based on a survey of those working in cultural and creative jobs (N=2487), a 
widespread acceptance of crucial inequalities across cultural work that are subsumed by the belief 
that hard work and talent are the motivators of success. Most notably this belief in ‘meritocracy’, as 
opposed to grounding the issues affecting the sector in the reproduction of social inequality, is most 
strongly held by those in the survey who reported the highest levels of earnings. This suggests an 
important barrier to social change in cultural and creative jobs, whereby those most successful are 
least likely to hold attitudes that might form the basis to resist the operation of social structural 
forces associated with the exclusion of women, non-white individuals, and working class origin 
communities (O’Brien et al 2016). 
1.1: Studying cultural and creative work 
There are longstanding academic debates, research programmes and disciplinary traditions 
associated with the study of cultural and creative work. Initially of interest to cultural studies, the 
area has generated a wealth of research in economics, geography and sociology, alongside core 
insights in business, management and organisation studies. We can think through this literature as 
having three phases and three distinct forms, associated with a range of differing positions on the 
virtues, or otherwise, of working in a cultural or creative job. The first consists of those writers and 
policy makers who have attempted to theorise what cultural and creative labour is and where the 
specific boundaries of creative occupations can be drawn. Second there are the debates around 
inequalities in cultural and creative work, with some (e.g. Florida 2002) arguing for cultural jobs to 
be seen as a blueprint or model for the rest of economy and society, while others are much more 
critical of working life in cultural and creative industries. This debate is summarised in the following 
section as it sets the contours for attitudes towards inequality. Finally there is more recent literature 
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aiming to theorise creative work’s relationship to broader social trends, including urban policy 
(Evans 2000), gender (Luckman 2015, Conor et al 2015), management practice (Harney 2015) and 
cultural theory itself (exemplified by a recent collections by Banks et al 2013). 
Understanding what, exactly constitutes CCIs has been a longstanding problem. The original 
advocates for taking cultural production seriously as part of the economy (e.g. McRobbie 2002) were 
directly concerned with highlighting both the transformative and in some cases emancipatory nature 
of cultural production and its potential for economic and, in the case of cities and local jurisdictions, 
political impact (see O’Brien 2014 for a detailed discussion of this history). However, the eventual 
establishment of cultural and creative industries in the form recognised across British and 
Commonwealth nations (as well as exported to south east Asian jurisdictions via the British Council, 
Prince 2010), broadened out the set of occupations to include a focus on the production and control 
of intellectual property, bringing computer services and IT into an expanded set of ‘creative’, as 
opposed to merely ‘cultural’ industries. Indeed, in the American context the most notable advocate 
of the impact of creative work on economy and society, Richard Florida, took the category to include 
science, law and large sections of financial services, in contrast to the more traditional ‘copyright’ 
industries discussed in US literature (e.g. Ross 2007). 
More recently critiques of the intellectual property basis of creative industries (e.g. Hesmondhalgh 
2013) and the role of software and computer services in inflating the economic importance of the 
sector in the UK (Campbell 2013) paved the way for a redefinition of the sector and the current 
settlement. This conception of cultural and creative industries has repositioned the act of ‘creativity’ 
at the centre of the occupational boundary drawing exercise to delimit the creative and cultural 
industries from other parts of the economy. Creativity is: ‘A role within the creative process that 
brings cognitive skills to bear to bring about a differentiation to yield either novel, or significantly 
enhanced products whose final form is not fully specified in advance’ (NESTA, 2013, p. 24) and those 
occupations with the required intensity of creativity yield the current definition of a cultural and 
creative job, whereby ‘in essence a creative industry is defined as being one which employs a 
significant proportion of creative people, as identified by those being employed in a creative 
occupation. The debates, however, continue (O’Brien et al 2016). For the purposes of this paper, and 
to speak to the context of the DCMS/UK model of creative and cultural occupations, what follows 
uses nine overarching sectors of the economy (IT, Software and Computer Services; Advertising and 
Marketing; Music, performing and visual arts; Product, graphic, and fashion design; Publishing; Film, 
TV, video, radio, and photography; Crafts; Architecture; Museums, Galleries and Libraries), 
corresponding to 30 individual occupations. 
Although the debate over the exact boundaries of cultural and creative jobs is still ongoing, the 
recent expansion of discussions over the impact of cultural and creative labour on a range of 
intellectual and social sectors has been crucial to reinforcing the perception of cultural and creative 
work as worth of specific study (see Oakley and O’Connor 2015 for a summary). In addition to the 
research base, there has been, in both the UK and USA, extensive media and public discussion of 
these issues. From #oscarssowhite and questions of ethnic diversity and representation in cultural 
industries in America, through to recent comments by high profile cultural practitioners in the UK as 
to the class basis of cultural work, there is considerable interest in the issue of inequality in access to 
cultural work, the implications of this access for representations and then the subsequent 
relationship to cultural consumption (Oakley and O’Brien 2016).  
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1.2: What do we know about inequality in cultural and creative occupations? 
It is clear, therefore, from the existing research base that there is a mismatch between narratives of 
an open, meritocratic, set of occupations and the structural barriers to those who are not blessed 
with affluence, or those who are not the ‘default’ white, middle class male. The former point, that 
cultural occupations might represent a ‘meritocracy’ is vital to understanding the significance of 
attitudinal data within any understanding of the sector.  
The research explored in the previous section, for example McRobbie’s (2016) recent work, 
identifies the tension between the structures of cultural labour markets and the narratives 
associated with work within those subsectors of the economy. Cultural work is narrated as open to 
everyone. In the UK, the national setting for the attitudinal data discussed in this paper, there has 
been cross-government support for this narrative (O’Brien 2014). The possibility that all citizens 
might be part of creative work is a celebratory discourse, albeit one that can easily be reframed to 
justify prevailing social inequalities under the assumption that the ‘creatives’ are straightforwardly 
entitled to the rewards befitting their ability. This narrative is, of course, intertwined with 
meritocratic justifications for a range of other social inequalities (Littler 2013). 
The meritocratic narrative of creativity within British public and policy discourses is not unique. 
Indeed, the best know statement of the idea of creative and cultural work as a meritocratic system 
suffused with workers displaying open, tolerant and meritocratic attitudes, is in the work of Richard 
Florida on the ‘creative class’ (2002). Concentrating on the urban policy implications of a new cadre 
of cultural and creative workers, Florida argued cities must mirror the attitudes of openness, 
tolerance and meritocracy that characterizes creative workers. The discursive construction of these 
workers, who Florida celebrates for both their economic potential and their demographic, 
consumption, and attitudinal characteristics, is an excellent example of the ideal type creative 
workers who are, supposedly, characteristic of cultural occupations. However, as recent research 
has demonstrated, these workers are subject to specific structural advantages that are only 
tenuously linked to their creative capacity and owe much to broader, socially patterned, forms of 
inequality.  
The previous section detailed the range of critical academic engagements with cultural work, which 
have focused on issues such as working conditions (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2010; McRobbie, 
2002), institutional barriers to access (Conor et al 2015) and the limits of cultural occupations’ 
contribution to the creative economy (Oakley 2014). Specific work on employment patterns in 
cultural work has a long history, but there has been a recent flurry of new research based on specific 
occupations (e.g. Koppman 2015, Friedman et al 2016) or new national datasets (O’Brien et al 2016). 
Koppman’s (2015) work in the USA has shown how shared cultural tastes correlated with middle 
class backgrounds are highly influential in hiring practices within CCIs, concurring with Rivera (2015) 
that hiring is, in effect, a form of cultural matching rather than a meritocratic exercise.  Here the idea 
of meritocracy and talent, as opposed to having the right cultural tastes or background, obscures the 
role of gender (Gill 2002), class (Friedman et al 2016) and ethnicity (Saha 2015) in shaping who gets 
in and gets on in cultural work. The role of these social structural factors have been demonstrated in 
a recent review of the literature on inequalities of cultural production by O’Brien and Oakley (2016), 
who pointed to the consensus in the literature on the continued importance of institutional barriers 
for those who were not white, affluent, men.  Indeed, the question of barriers to entry into cultural 
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jobs has been a major part of recent work, including barriers of class (Randle et al, 2014, Eikhof and 
Warhurst 2012; Friedman et al 2016), of education (e.g. Banks & Oakley, 2015; Scharff, 2015; Bull, 
2014; Allen, 2014) and of social networks (Nelligan, 2015). 
The barriers manifest themselves in the uneven shape of the cultural workforce, with specific issues 
in particular occupations. A recent analysis of 2014 Labour Force Survey (LFS) data in the UK (O’Brien 
et al 2016) found those from affluent backgrounds are hugely overrepresented in many cultural 
occupations, along with uneven representation of women and those from minority ethnic origins. 
For example, 43% of people working in publishing, 28% in music and 26% in design come from an 
affluent background, compared with 14% of the population in the LFS. Fewer than 7% of employees 
in large parts of the Creative and Cultural Industries are members of black or minority ethnic groups. 
Just 4% of those working in design, and 5% of people in crafts across the UK are non-white. Excluding 
the IT sector, only 6.5% of workers in Cultural and Creative Industries (CCIs) are non-white. Figures 
from the Office for National Statistics (2012) show that 14% of the population in England and Wales 
and more than 40% of London’s population are black and minority ethnic (BAME). The most 
ethnically diverse CCI is IT, software and computing: around 15% of employees are from BAME 
backgrounds. However, just 15% of employees in this occupation are women. Women make up 54% 
of publishing, but just 24% of film, TV, radio and photography employees and 30% of architecture 
employees are female. 
Moreover, the LFS data indicated clear pay gaps related to gender and social class origin. There is a 
significant gender and class ‘ceiling’, where women in cultural and creative industries earn, on 
average, an estimated £112 per week (around £5,800 a year) less than otherwise similar men doing 
the same jobs. In many parts of the industry of the CCIs, workers from the most privileged 
backgrounds earned more than the rest of the CCI workforce, even when they were doing the same 
jobs. In IT the earnings gap is estimated at £117 per week based on the social background of the 
worker, and in publishing it is about £191 per week. 
The uneven shape of the cultural workforce in the UK can be accounted for through the barriers 
identified by existing research surveyed earlier in this article. A useful illustration of the relationship 
between critical research, studies of LFS data, and the operations of specific occupations comes from 
Friedman et al (2016), using the example of acting as a key cultural occupation. They found actors 
were disproportionately male and disproportionately drawn from privileged class backgrounds, with 
over half (51% of actors in the LFS) from ‘middle-class’ professional or managerial backgrounds, as 
opposed to 29% of the population surveyed by LFS. By contrast, Friedman et al’s (2016) analysis 
suggested that only 16% of actors in the LFS have parents who worked in semi-routine and routine 
employment, compared with 33% of all LFS respondents.  
In addition, those from less privileged backgrounds who did make it into acting faced lower pay rates 
than those from more affluent starting points. This analysis suggested difficulties entering education, 
accessing agents (crucial intermediaries within the labour market for actors), getting parts and 
navigating the assumptions associated with typecasting. All of these barriers pointed to the 
operation of differing cultural, economic and social network resources, again a variation of hiring as 
cultural matching, which owed more to the social structure of cultural production in the UK than any 
individual creative capacity.  
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This latter point raises two questions. On the one hand there is a question of how this social 
structure is experienced, something of which the existing literature surveyed above has offered a 
detailed overview. Second, and less well developed in existing work, is the question of how these 
structures are perpetuated within the attitudes and assumptions of those occupied in cultural 
labour. There is this still a need to understand how barriers to getting in and getting on operate. 
Here understanding broader attitudes towards inequality, as a route to understanding how these 
attitudes function within creative work, is essential.  
1.3: What do we know about attitudes to inequality? 
Crucially, it does not follow that inequalities in CCIs mean that people working in or around CCIs 
believe that the sector is unequal: for example, people in the sector may erroneously believe that 
people from different class backgrounds are paid the same. In addition, people may acknowledge 
that inequalities exist, but they may believe that inequalities are just and fair: they may believe that 
success is overwhelmingly determined by talent, and that the most talented people happen to 
disproportionately come from privileged backgrounds.  
Both within and beyond the CCIs, people’s beliefs about inequality take a number of different 
dimensions, including both knowledge of inequality and normative beliefs about inequality. McCall 
and Chin (2013) investigate what people believe the ratios between the highest- and lowest-paid 
workers in organisations are and what they should be; they find that not only do people believe that 
high and low pay should be closer together, they also significantly underestimate actual 
discrepancies, believing that the income distribution is more equal than it actually is. Relatedly, 
Loveless and Whitefield (2011) investigate more generally questions of “social inequality”, asking 
whether levels of social inequality where people live are too high, about right, or too low; Isaksson 
and Lindskog (2009) investigate whether people believe that government should intervene in order 
to change the situation.  
Here, we focus on perceived inequality of opportunity (Brunori, 2015). This dimension is measured 
by presenting respondents with a battery of items, and asking how important each of those is in 
terms of getting ahead. Respondents who report that coming from a wealthy family, knowing the 
right people, and having been born a man are all essential to getting ahead might be considered to 
perceive inequality of opportunity as high, while a respondent who considers those items to be not 
at all important, while holding ambition and hard work as essential, might be considered to perceive 
inequality of opportunity as low. It therefore can be considered to incorporate both knowledge and 
normative beliefs: it is impossible to determine exactly how much people’s success can be attributed 
to their hard work, but the literature generally finds that people who are better-informed about 
workplace conditions perceive inequality of opportunity as higher. Batteries of this form have been 
used in large-scale social surveys including the General Social Survey in the USA, and the 
International Social Survey Programme3.  
Studies using these batteries of questions tend to find that people’s beliefs about inequality are that 
processes err on the side of fairness, with overall higher scores on items like “hard work” than 
“coming from a wealthy family”. However, this varies internationally, with people in richer countries 
                                                          
3 It has also been shown that different measurements of attitudes to inequality are related: those who believe 
inequality to be greater are also more skeptical of equality of opportunity (McCall and Chin, 2013) 
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generally believing that processes are fairer than do people in poorer countries (Brunori, 2015). In 
addition, men generally perceive greater inequality, as do older people (Hanson and Wells-Dang, 
2005), while the relationship between perception of inequality and education varies cross-nationally 
(Hanson and Wells-Dang, 2005; Reynolds and Xian, 2014). 
However, while these relationships vary cross-nationally, the correlations between attitudes 
themselves are relatively stable. While some studies investigate responses to battery items 
individually, others investigate the relationships between items. Both Hanson and Wells-Dang (2009) 
and Reynolds and Xian (2014) use factor analysis on the batteries of questions in order to either 
construct or validate scales; in this way, they investigate whether people who rate “being a man” as 
important rate “talent” as being less important. In both papers, there are fairly coherent scales 
constitutive of effort, hard work, and similar; these are described as either “meritocracy” or “human 
capital”. Higher scores on these scales correspond to more egalitarian beliefs about how society 
works. Both papers also find two scales that can be considered to be in tension with this, “ascriptive” 
or “structural”, and “discrimination” or “friends and family”. The first of these consists of race, 
religion, and gender; the latter, of coming from a wealthy family and knowing the right people. 
While high scores on each of these scales both correspond to less egalitarian beliefs about how 
society works, they are also distinct from each other; it is plausible to believe that discrimination 
takes place because of who you know rather than more fundamental demographic issues. Finally, 
Hanson and Wells-Dang find a fourth factor, with the heaviest loadings coming from one’s own 
education and the education of one’s parents. This can be seen as being relatively orthogonal to 
questions of fairness; it is possible to construct narratives around education being used as an 
arbitrary barrier to entry, and around it being a way to suitably train people for roles. 
In addition, while these dimensions differ in their perceived inequality of opportunity – those with 
higher scores on meritocracy are likely to perceive inequality of opportunity as lower, while those 
with higher scores on discrimination are likely to perceive it as higher – the dimensions are not at 
odds with each other. As they are constructed via principal components analysis, the dimensions are 
relatively independent of one another. In addition, it is not incoherent to simultaneously hold that 
it’s important to be hard-working and talented and to be a white man from a wealthy family: 
someone holding such a position might recognise structural discrimination, while believing that 
privileged people can still only get ahead if they are also talented and hard-working. Similarly, some 
people score low on all these dimensions; this might reflect that they believe that who gets ahead is 
more-or-less random, or indeed that the things that are important in terms of getting ahead weren’t 
mentioned in the battery of questions. 
In terms of cultural and creative industries, we might expect two findings from any research on 
attitudes to inequality. On the one hand the research by Florida (2002) suggests attitudes of 
openness, tolerance and a commitment to meritocracy are prevalent across the creative sector. This 
would be the basis for a hypothesis of a strong set of support for meritocratic beliefs about the 
sector, including the importance of talent and hard work for success in the labour market. On the 
other hand, the research surveyed earlier in this paper suggests cultural occupations are subject to 
significant exclusions that are well known to participants (e.g. Friedman et al 2016 on the acting 
profession). Here we would expect faith in meritocracy to be weaker for those groups of non-white, 
non-male, less affluent origin individuals and communities that are under-represented in cultural 
work and experience exclusions from cultural labour markets. However, as our data will 
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demonstrate, the picture is complex, showing a cluster of occupations whose practitioners have a 
strong belief in the meritocratic nature of cultural work, albeit one that is strongly socially stratified. 
The socially stratified nature of these attitudes suggests the potential for transformation of the 
social structures underpinning the inequalities identified within cultural and creative occupations 
(Oakley and O’Brien 2015) is limited by the beliefs of the cultural workforce.  
2: Data and methods 
The data were collected over the period 21 September-20 October, via an online survey hosted at 
the Guardian4 under the headline ‘Do you work in the arts, culture, or creative industries? Take our 
survey on diversity in the sector.’  Links to the survey were heavily promoted on social media, 
including tweets from organisations such as Equity, the Musicians’ Union, the Arts Council England, 
various different Guardian accounts, and several others.  
Because of this recruitment method, this is a nonrepresentative sample and should be treated in 
that way. While results may be indicative of a population of people working in the CCIs, they also 
may not; conclusions are limited to those participants who opted in to the survey. However, as the 
introduction has indicated, these issues are supported by existing, more representative, survey 
material. 
In total, there were 2540 responses to the survey, of which an estimated 53 were duplicates, leaving 
a total of 2487 cases. The survey involved a total of 7 sections: on people’s roles in the cultural and 
creative industries; the amount of time they’ve spent working in their sector; their sources of 
income and outgoings; their experiences of working without pay; their attitudes towards what’s 
important in getting ahead in their sector; their social contacts; relevant demographic questions 
(including questions on social origin); and various free-text fields.   
Here, we focus on the questions about getting ahead. We use the well-validated battery of questions 
described above about perceived inequality of opportunity. In most surveys, the question is asked 
‘Please tick one box for each of these to show how important you think it is for getting ahead in 
life…’, and presented with a series of items. In this case, the options remain the same, but the 
original stimulus is changed to ‘Looking at your creative occupation as a whole, how important do 
you think each of these is in getting ahead?’, focusing the questions on the respondent’s sector 
specifically rather than life in general. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we report descriptive statistics of each of the items within 
this bank of questions, and for relevant indicator variables. Second, we describe principal 
components analysis on this same bank of questions, in order to identify whether these items can be 
reduced to a smaller number of latent variables. Third, we use regression models in order to 
estimate the relationships between relevant indicator variables and factors. Analysis was conducted 
in Stata 14.1, and graphics were prepared in R using the ggplot2 package. 
3: Results 
3.1: Descriptive statistics 
                                                          
4 http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2015/sep/21/panic-survey-diversity-arts-culture-creative-industries 
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Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for relevant indicator variables, and Figure 1 shows the 
distributions of responses to each item in the bank of questions about getting ahead, on a scale from 
“not at all important” to “essential”. 
Table 1 about here 
Figure 1 about here 
Table 1 shows that, while the survey was nominally targeted at people working across the CCIs, the 
distribution of sector sizes is very different from the national picture painted by the Labour Force 
Survey (O’Brien et al 2016, table 1), most conspicuously by the underrepresentation of workers in IT 
(2% compared with 29%), and the overrepresentation of workers in performance and music (29% 
compared with 9%) and in museums, galleries and libraries (15% compared with 3%).  
In terms of the other indicator variables, a relatively high percentage of respondents (22%) reported 
at least one disability; in most cases, this related to mental health. Most respondents had at least an 
undergraduate degree (82%, compared with 64% across the CCIs). A large majority of respondents 
(69%) were women, while the only CCIs that are predominantly women in the LFS are women are 
museums, galleries and libraries, and publishing. Respondents were generally poorly paid: 28% 
received less than £5k pa from their practice, with only 23% receiving more than £30k pa. Crucially, 
only 24% of respondents classified both parents as being in anything other than professional or 
managerial jobs, indicating that the sample overwhelmingly consists of people from what might be 
classified as “middle-class backgrounds”; this is an even smaller fraction than in the CCIs as a whole 
(O’Brien et al 2016, table 2).  88% of the sample identified themselves as being white, a slightly 
smaller fraction than the CCIs in general and a similar figure to that of the overall UK population; 
however, this looks unusually white given that a huge 45% of respondents were based in London, 
which was overall 60% white at the 2011 census. Finally, the mean age in the sample is just under 
37, and relatively few respondents are new to their sector, with just 13% having worked in it for less 
than a year.  
The sample is therefore clearly not representative of the CCIs in the UK in a number of ways. The 
particular sectors of the CCIs that it consists of are different, with more actors and fewer 
programmers; it has far more women; it is more London-centric; it is more highly-educated; it is 
younger. Given recruitment was opt-in, participants are those who recognise themselves as working 
in the cultural and creative industries, and who find out about a survey hosted at the Guardian, likely 
through unions and relevant professional bodies. Indeed, these are the sectors who receive more of 
the celebratory discourse around the cultural and creative industries, in spite of representing a 
relatively small part of their workforce and an even smaller part of contribution to GDP for which 
they are supposedly lauded. In this way, it is closer to representing an ideal type image of the CCIs: 
probably young, highly-educated women in London whose parents had middle class jobs.  
Figure 1 shows that the highest-rated attribute overall for getting ahead is “hard work”, rated 
“essential” by 62% of the sample, and followed closely behind by “ambition”, rated “essential” by 
54% of the sample. At the opposite extreme is “your religion”, rated “not important at all” by 67% of 
the sample, followed by “your ethnicity” at 35% (and another 25% “not very important”). In general, 
figure 1 indicates that attributes associated with a meritocratic account of the CCIs are more highly-
regarded than attributes associated with an account consistent with reproduction, although there is 
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one exception to this: 43% of the sample responded that it’s essential to know the right people, with 
another 32% responding that it’s very important. These results are broadly similar to those in other 
studies, indicating that respondents in the creative industries broadly hold similar attitudes about 
inequality of opportunity in their sectors as do people living in rich countries do about the societies 
they live in in general.  
3.2: Principal components analysis 
As with other studies using the same or similar questions, we use principal components factor 
analysis and conduct a varimax rotation, with a minimum eigenvector value of 1. This retains 3 
factors, with loadings shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2 about here 
This analysis results in three distinctive factors, which we have labelled “Reproduction”, 
“Meritocracy”, and “Education”. Each of the variables intuitively associated with a reproduction 
account – gender, ethnicity, knowing the right people, coming from a wealthy family, class, and 
religion – has a weighting on the “reproduction” factor of over 0.3; the same is true for ambition, 
hard work, and talent on the “meritocracy” factor. A third factor is dominated by “your education”, 
although “having well-educated parents” is also prominent.  
The crucial difference between these results and those in the other papers described above is the 
fact that non-meritocratic variables are all in a single factor, while in other work these variables can 
be distinguished into “friends and family” and “discrimination”. In other studies, it is consistent to 
hold that being well-connected is crucial for getting ahead while factors associated with more 
explicit discrimination, such as racism, are not salient; instead, here, they are coherent in a single 
“reproduction” factor. The other factors, “meritocracy” and “education”, are consistent with what’s 
seen elsewhere. 
The distributions of the factors among individuals within the sample, and the relationships between 
them, are shown in figure 3. 
Figure 3 about here. 
Both the reproduction and education factors are approximately normally distributed, while the 
meritocracy factor is negatively skewed. This can be accounted for by the distributions of the items 
that have the highest loadings onto this factor: very few respondents reported that one’s religion, 
gender, and ethnicity were essential for getting ahead, for example, so a respondent who did 
respond in that way has an extremely low score on that factor; by contrast, a respondent who said 
that each of these things was not at all important is much closer to the modal value. The weak 
correlations between the factors following the rotation - positive between education and 
meritocracy, and negative between education and reproduction – also make intuitive and plausible 
sense.  
3.3 Regression results 
We predicted each of the factors using linear regressions (with robust standard errors) with the 
same independent variables in each case, the only difference being the dependent variable.  
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We first address the model predicting the “education” factor: briefly, the only things associated with 
large coefficients5 for this factor are respondents’ own education levels, and the sector in which they 
work. People working in each of publishing and architecture hold particularly high scores on this 
factor: this is unsurprising, as in the case of architecture holding higher-level qualifications in the 
discipline is necessary in order to practice, while in publishing a large fraction of workers have 
postgraduate qualifications in publishing. Meanwhile, people working in IT are particularly unlikely 
to think education is important to getting ahead; this may reflect some narratives within the sector 
that credentialism can be harmful, and that qualifications do not add a great deal.  
Other than those variables, though, no other is strongly associated with this factor; this is also 
reflected in the particularly low R-squared for this model.   
The model predicting the “meritocracy” factor varies by more of the independent variables, 
although several still have relatively small associations. Younger people have higher meritocracy 
scores, although the difference between an 18-year old and a 25-year old are smaller than those 
between a 48-year old and a 55-year old, as shown by the quadratic term. Women score higher on 
this scale than do men. Sector-wise, people in each of crafts and design have higher scores than the 
average, while people working in museums and galleries score lowest of all on this scale. Crucially, 
people’s scores on the meritocracy factor increase as does their income, with very large differences 
between the highest and lowest parts of the scale. However, differences according to parents’ 
occupations are smaller; people from traditional professional backgrounds score higher than others, 
but not wildly, and the differences between other parental backgrounds are marginal. Regional 
variation is fairly low. This model has a scarcely higher R-squared than that for education. 
The model predicting the “reproduction” factor reflects that of the “meritocracy” factor in some 
ways, but not all. Women score higher on this factor, as they do on meritocracy, and there is even 
less regional variation. The differences in income and parents’ occupation reflect those for 
“meritocracy”; however, while the differences for people from traditional professional backgrounds 
are roughly as negative as they were positive, the differences by one’s income are even larger. 
However, while on the “meritocracy” factor there were only small differences by disability and 
ethnicity, on “reproduction” people with disabilities score moderately higher than people without 
disabilities, and white people score drastically lower than non-white people. Finally, occupational 
differences also vary: here, the groups with highest scores on “reproduction” are those working in 
performance and music, and in visual arts.  
Comparing the models, we can see that the reproduction model has the highest R-square of the 
three, and that where there are relationships between predictor variables and the outcome 
variables, the coefficients are also largest for the reproduction variable. In some ways, this reflects 
the larger variance within this category: almost everyone thinks that hard work and talent are 
important in terms of getting ahead, with the crucial differences in the “meritocracy” scale being 
between the highly-paid and everyone else. By contrast, mean scores on the items that make up the 
“reproduction” scale are lower, and differences on these scores differ more consistently across 
groups of interest: while the crucial difference on the “meritocracy” scale was about pay, the 
                                                          
5 While these tables include stars for significance testing, this is misleading as the sample was not randomly 
selected from a population. Because of this, we focus mainly on effect sizes, highlighting differences between 
groups, rather than measures of statistical significance. 
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differences between the high- and low-paid on reproduction are twice the size of those on 
meritocracy, with additional differences on ethnicity and disability. Surprisingly, women score higher 
than men on both of these scales.  
Perhaps the most surprising finding is the relatively small set of coefficients associated with 
respondents’ backgrounds; the only significant differences between those people whose parents 
had non-managerial or professional jobs are those whose parents were traditional professionals. 
This is surprising for two reasons. The first is that one might expect that the magnitude of the 
differences in incomes between people of different class backgrounds, discussed above, would 
translate into differences between these groups in their recognition of how one becomes successful. 
The second is the moderate numbers of people reporting believing that “coming from a wealthy 
family” and “your class” are important to getting ahead. While these numbers are dwarfed by those 
for “knowing the right people” and “your talent”, it seems here that the belief that class background 
is moderately important does not map on to people from different class backgrounds having 
different attitudes towards what’s important in getting ahead.  
4: Discussion 
There is a straightforward positive reading of these results: people working in the CCIs in the UK 
think that the sector is more or less fair, with hard work being the most important thing for getting 
ahead, and the least important things being religion, gender, ethnicity and class. However, this 
account is complicated by asking who, exactly, thinks that these are the most and least important 
things respectively. The people who are least likely to say that the process of getting ahead reflects 
more general social reproduction are highly-paid non-disabled white men. 
We might answer the question “what do cultural workers think about inequality?” by saying “the 
same as everyone else”. These results are not in major tension with research that uses similar 
batteries of questions in other contexts. Compared with this research, there is a handful of surprises 
– for example, people’s attitudes towards the importance of knowing the right people and coming 
from a wealthy family load onto the same single factor as your ethnicity and your class, and women 
score higher on both the meritocracy and reproduction factors – but there is nothing here that 
indicates that the attitudes of people working in the CCIs are radically different from those working 
in other sectors, or in none at all. This may imply that awareness of issues of access to the CCIs have 
not got through to people who work in them, or at least to any greater extent than the general 
population. This might be considered surprising, given how high-profile the debate around issues of 
access were at the time of data collection. Alternatively, it may be that the issue was high-profile but 
people actually working in the sector rejected accounts in which access to the sector was unequal; 
this may have felt necessary in order for people to justify their own success, preferring to feel that 
their success in the sector was due to their own individual traits rather than more general structural 
issues. This may be particularly relevant given that the people whose account is most in the direction 
of fairness are the people who are most handsomely rewarded by the sector.  Indeed, this sits in the 
context in which there are two different dimensions through which cultural workers express their 
attitudes towards inequality – reproduction and meritocracy – and it is not just the case that the 
better-rewarded are more likely to ascribe success to talent, but that they are even more likely to 
deny the relationship between success and structural factors. 
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However, one surprising finding is the relatively weak relationship between attitudes towards 
inequality and class origin. Even if we account for the fact that self-reported descriptions of what 
kinds of jobs people’s parents had is likely to weaken any true relationships, the differences are 
substantially smaller than for those variables relating to people’s present conditions. This is 
surprising, as one might expect that those whose transition into working in the CCIs has been 
relatively smooth, via elite (expensive) institutions and the ability to work for free for long periods 
without hardship, would be less likely to see structural barriers, whereas those people who have 
directly experienced them would be more likely to do so. This is, at least, the narrative one expects 
given public discussion of inequality in access to the sector.  
Given these results, there is no reason to imagine that the situation is likely to change. Access to the 
CCIs is still constrained by structural factors; these structural factors are predominantly recognised 
by those in the sector in precarious positions, whereas those in stronger positions are more likely to 
generate a meritocratic narrative of how people end up in their positions. It is difficult to see where 
the impetus for the situation to change would come from.   
5: Conclusion 
This paper has explored attitudes prevailing within cultural and creative occupations, with a focus on 
inequality. This focus aimed to respond both to media interest in inequality and cultural jobs, as well 
as extending current academic understandings of cultural and creative work. By focusing on the 
attitudes of cultural workers towards inequality, notably by demonstrating those surveyed all 
support a some version of a meritocratic account of getting in and getting on in the sector, the paper 
has important implications for future research and engagement activity with cultural and creative 
occupations. In the first instance, as the discussion has indicated, the attitudes towards inequality in 
the sample are in keeping with broader social attitudes, suggesting cultural and creative labour, at 
least in attitudinal terms is neither more or less well disposed to social critique than other 
occupations. At the same time, this finding casts doubt on research that suggests these occupations 
exhibit more meritocratic attitudes than the rest of society. Thus both critical and ‘creative class’ 
claims for the uniqueness of cultural work should be treated more cautiously.  
Second, and connecting to the origins of the study of cultural and creative work, the findings and 
discussion query the transformative potential of the cultural sector, given that it displays a belief in 
the meritocratic nature of cultural jobs and that belief is stronger in those with higher incomes. 
These attitudes are at odds with research on both the shape of the labour market for cultural work 
(O’Brien and Oakley 2015) and the composition of the cultural workforce (O’Brien at al 2016).  
Indeed, the evidence that the younger and the higher earning, respondents have higher 
‘meritocracy’ scores means this political project may be further in doubt. Concurrently these higher 
scores may add weight to those authors (e.g. McRobbie 2016) seeking to account for cultural and 
creative labour through forms of individualisation associated with theories of neo-liberalism. More 
research work on connecting attitudes in a range of nations beyond the UK to broader theories of 
cultural work may prove fruitful here.  
The positive reading, which is associated with the idea that people think the sector in which they 
work is fair and meritocratic is most troubling, given the research that has revelled the structural and 
overwhelming inequalities within cultural work. As a result, we should expect more media attention 
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to address questions of access, representation and consumption but there is little indication that 
these controversies will challenge the faith individual cultural workers have in the role that hard 
work and talent plays in getting in and getting on.  
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Tables and figures: 
Table 1: descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean N Variable Mean N 
Disability status 0.22 2487 Parent's occupation 
 Ethnicity = white 0.88 2090 Senior manager 0.19 2486 
Education = degree or greater 0.82 2487 Trad professional 0.18 2486 
Age (sd) 
36.97 
(11.05) 2468 Middle/jnr mgr 0.09 2486 
Gender 
  
Modern prof 0.29 2486 
Male 0.31 2486 NS-SEC 3-7 0.24 2486 
Female 0.69 2486 Time in the industry 
 Other 0.01 2486 >6 months 0.08 2486 
Sector 
  
6 months-1 year 0.05 2486 
Advertising/marketing 0.06 2486 1-2 years 0.09 2486 
Architecture 0.01 2486 2-5 years 0.19 2486 
Craft 0.02 2486 5-10 years 0.21 2486 
Design 0.06 2486 More than 10 years 0.38 2486 
Film/TV/Video/Radio/Photography 0.08 2486 Region 
  IT 0.02 2486 East of England 0.05 2347 
Museums/Galleries/Libraries 0.15 2486 West Midlands 0.04 2347 
NA/Other 0.1 2486 East Midlands 0.03 2347 
Performance/Music 0.29 2486 North East 0.03 2347 
Publishing 0.07 2486 North West 0.07 2347 
Visual Arts 0.12 2486 Yorkshire 0.05 2347 
Income 
  
South East 0.11 2347 
>5k 0.28 2487 London 0.45 2347 
5-10k 0.1 2487 South West 0.06 2347 
10-20k 0.16 2487 Wales 0.04 2347 
20-30k 0.24 2487 Northern Ireland 0.01 2347 
30-50k 0.17 2487 Scotland 0.07 2347 
>50k 0.06 2487 
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Figure 1: descriptive statistics  
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Figure 2: principal components analysis factor loadings  
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Figure 3: distributions of factors and relationships between factors 
 
Table 2: regression results 
 
Reproduction Meritocracy Education 
Disabled 0.404*** -0.0721 0.0785 
Ethnicity = white -1.076*** 0.21 -0.0368 
Education = degree+ 0.0908 -0.114 0.192**  
Age 0.0536 -0.0528* 0.0124 
Age squared -0.000635 0.000489* -0.00014 
Gender (base = male) 
  Female 0.239** 0.272*** 0.103
Other 1.661 -0.307 0.331 
Sector (base = advertising/marketing 
 Architecture -0.185 0.0319 0.417*   
Crafts -0.815* 0.526* -0.477*   
Deisgn -0.246 0.334* -0.311*   
Film/TV/video/radio/photography 0.329 0.201 -0.267 
IT 0.162 -0.298 -0.671**  
Museums, galleries, libraries -0.0947 -0.439** 0.138 
NA/other 0.31 -0.0286 -0.0288 
Peformance/music 0.522** 0.098 -0.203 
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Publishing 0.277 -0.243 0.277*   
Visual arts 0.407* 0.075 -0.0855 
Income (base >5k) 
  5-10k -0.133 0.137 0.184
10-20k -0.415** 0.161 0.139 
20-30k -0.795*** 0.187 0.157 
30-50k -1.027*** 0.384*** 0.122 
50k+ -1.423*** 0.681*** 0.142 
Parents' occupation (base = NS-SEC 3-7) 
Senior mgr -0.24 0.0544 -0.118 
Trad prof -0.253* 0.262* 0.0278 
Middle/jnr mgr -0.195 0.0766 -0.116 
Modern prof -0.129 0.137 0.12 
Time in sector (base >6mo) 
 6mo-1yr 0.0864 -0.0689 0.0954
1-2 years -0.0536 0.0145 0.0281 
2-5 years 0.0421 0.0484 0.0916 
5-10 years -0.0316 -0.0394 0.0853 
10 years+ -0.00314 0.0131 0.104 
Region (base: East of England) 
 West Midlands -0.247 0.429* 0.0157
East Midlands 0.0742 0.0712 0.0879 
North East -0.252 0.103 -0.227 
North West 0.00628 0.0215 -0.0296 
Yorkshire -0.0943 0.0614 -0.0541 
South East -0.0653 -0.0769 0.0479 
London 0.352 -0.156 -0.0233 
South West 0.122 0.0861 -0.036 
Wales -0.16 0.154 0.0327 
Northern Ireland -0.642 0.493* -0.325 
Scotland -0.0824 0.0537 0.0254 
Constant -0.305 0.696 -0.599 
N 1985 1985 1985 
R squared 0.1715 0.0648 0.0516 
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